STATEMENT: This paper addresses the admission control and resource allocation problem in connection-oriented networks that support multiple heterogeneous applications, that is, applications with dierent trac characteristics and dierent Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. The challenge is to determine a resource allocation scheme that: (i) meets the QoS requirements of the services provided by the network; (ii) eciently allocates resources by appropriately distributing the QoS among the various resources at each link along the path of a connection; (iii) satises the user's preferences and simultaneously is social-welfare maximizing; and (iv) satises the informational constraints imposed by the network; specically it takes into account the fact that the network is an informationally decentralized system where the number of users is unknown, and each user's preferences and input trac characteristics are private information. The contribution of this paper in this area is as follows: (1) the formulation of a general optimization problem that has the following features: (a) incorporation of the QoS requirements along paths; (b) allocation of resources along paths with multiple links; (c) allocation of multiple type of resources at each link; (d) independent self-interest users that request multiple types of service; (2) the proof of existence of a welfare maximizing solution; (3) the construction of a two market economy and an iterative pricing scheme that leads to the solution of the original optimization problem with arbitrary precision, in a nite number of steps. We believe that this paper provides additional evidence that economic market methods, and in particular pricing schemes, can be harnessed to implement ecient resource allocations in integrated-services networks. 
Introduction
The idea of a single shared physical network that will support multiple heterogeneous applications, that is, applications with dierent trac characteristics and different Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, is widely regarded as the way to meet the telecommunication challenges of the future. Packet-switched, connection-oriented networks have been proposed to oer the QoS guarantees in integrated-services networks, because in connectionless networks individual packets may exhibit a signicant variation in network service quality.
The challenge in integrated services connection-oriented networks is to determine general admission and resource allocation schemes that have the following desirable features: (i) they meet the QoS requirements of the services provided by the network; (ii) they eciently allocate resources by appropriately distributing the QoS among the various resources at each link along the path of a connection; (iii) they satisfy the user's preferences and simultaneously are social-welfare maximizing; (iv) they satisfy the informational constraints imposed by the network; specically they take into account the fact that the network is an informationally decentralized system where the number of users is unknown, and each user's preferences and input trac characteristics are private information. Consequently, the development of ecient admission and resource allocation schemes requires: (a) a quantication of the interaction between resource allocation and QoS requirements; such a quantication will be described by expressions that are function of the allocation of multiple resources at each link, as well as the allocation of resources along multi-link paths; (b) the discovery of mechanisms that delegate resource allocation decisions to individual users, yet they lead to social welfare maximizing solutions.
The above considerations have guided most of the research on admission control 1 and resource allocation in integrated services networks. The same considerations, in particular (iv) and (b) , have led to the use of microeconomic methods in the investigation of the aforementioned problems. Two basic microeconomic approaches have been used for the development of ecient decentralized resource allocation schemes in integrated services networks: resource-directed and price-directed, (Hurwicz, 1973) . In the resource-directed approach, each user (agent) computes the marginal values for his current resources, and communicates them to the rest of the users. The allocation is then changed so that users with an above a v erage marginal utility receive more of this resource and users with a below average marginal utility receive less. This approach has been used in (Kurose and Simha, 1989) to develop decentralized algorithms for optimally allocating a single resource to a set of interconnected computing agents. In the price-directed approach, an initial allocation of resources is made and an arbitrary set of systemwide initial resource prices is chosen. Prices then are iteratively changed to accommodate the "demands" for resources until the total demand for a resource exactly equals the total amount available. Most of the results on decentralized resource allocation currently available in the literature are based on the price-directed approach (Cocchi et al., 1993; MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995b; Jordan and Jiang, 1995; Jiang and Jordan, 1995; Wang et al., 1997; Kelly, 1994; Kelly et al., 1998; Gupta et al., 1997; Courcoubetis et al., 1997; MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995a; Low and Varaiya, 1993; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998; Thomas and Teneketzis, 1997) . Since in this paper we follow the price-directed approach to resource allocation, we critically review the results reported in (Cocchi et al., 1993; MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995b; Jordan and Jiang, 1995; Jiang and Jordan, 1995; Wang et al., 1997; Kelly, 1994; Kelly et al., 1998; Gupta et al., 1997; Courcoubetis et al., 1997; MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995a; Low and Varaiya, 1993; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998; Thomas and Teneketzis, 1997 ) so that we can point out to the contributions of our work.
The work currently available on decentralized resource allocation by price-directed methods has addressed, either by analysis Wang et al., 1997; Kelly, 1994; Kelly et al., 1998; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998; Gupta et al., 1997; Courcoubetis et al., 1997; MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995a; Low and Varaiya, 1993; Thomas and Teneketzis, 1997) , or simulation and analysis (Cocchi et al., 1993; Gupta et al., 1997) , a subset of the issues outlined in the second paragraph of this section. A signicant part of this work has dealt with single link networks (Wang et al., 1997; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998) , or with the allocation of a single resource per connection (Wang et al., 1997; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998; Jiang and Jordan, 1995; Kelly et al., 1998; Gupta et al., 1997; MacKieMason and Varian, 1995a) .
In several papers Wang et al., 1997; Kelly et al., 1998; Gupta et al., 1997; Low and Varaiya, 1993; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998; Thomas and Teneketzis, 1997 ) the following general philosophy to resource allocation by price-directed methods has been adopted: (1) formulate a centralized constrained optimization problem where the objective is the maximization of a social welfare function and the constraints are imposed by the QoS requirements and the availability of network resources; (2) use pricing methods to devise a decentralized scheme that realizes the solution of the centralized problem and satises the informational constraints imposed by the network. The existence of a solution to the centralized problem is shown, and market methods are used to structure and develop the solution. The existence of a set of prices that induce users to request the "optimal" allocation is established and, in some cases (Wang et al., 1997; Gupta et al., 1997; Low and Varaiya, 1993; de Veciana and Baldick, 1998; Thomas and Teneketzis, 1997 ), an iterative s c heme for adjusting the prices based on users' requests is described. However, none of the papers specify a mechanism to force the successive prices to converge to the "optimal" set of prices.
In this paper we follow the price-directed approach and the philosophy presented in the previous paragraph, to address the admission control and resource allocation problem in integrated services networks. Our formulation of the admission control and resource allocation problem captures the issues and considerations discussed in the second paragraph of this section. In particular, we consider a connection-oriented network that oers multiple services to users. Users' preferences are summarized by means of their utility functions, and each user is allowed to request more than one type of service. No assumption is made on the functional form of the utility functions, although some mild regularity conditions are imposed. We assume that the relation between QoS and resource allocation is given, (see discussion in Section 2), and we incorporate it as a constraint into a static optimization problem. The objective of the optimization problem is to determine the amount and, required resources for each type of service to maximize the sum of the users' utilities. We prove the existence of a solution of the optimization problem, and describe a competitive market economy that implements the solution and satises the informational constraints imposed by the nature of the decentralized resource allocation problem. The economy consists of four dierent types of agents: resource providers, service providers, users, and an auctioneer that regulates the prices based on the observed aggregate excess demand. The goods that are sold are: (i) the resources at each link of the network; and (ii) services constructed from these resources and then delivered to users. We specify an iterative procedure that is used by the auctioneer to update the prices, and we prove its convergence. In particular, we show that it leads to an allocation that is arbitrarily close to a solution of the optimization problem in a nite numberof iterations.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) the formulation of a general optimization problem that has the following features: (a) incorporation of the QoS requirements along paths; (b) allocation of resources along paths with multiple links; (c) allocation of multiple type of resources at each link; (d) independent self-interest users that request multiple types of service; (2) the proof of existence of a welfare maximizing solution; (3) the construction of an algorithm for nding a welfare maximizing solution with arbitrary precision in nite numberof steps.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formulate the optimization problem. In Section 3 we prove the existence of a solution, and in Section 4 we describe (Section 4.1) and analyze (Section 4.2) the competitive market economy that leads to an optimum allocation. In Section 5 we summarize the results, we discuss their implications, and we present some open problems that arise from this approach.
Problem Formulation
Consider a communication network that consists of a set L = f1; 2; : : : ; L g of links.
The network oers one-way connections to a set N = f1; 2; : : : ; N g of users. There is also a set M i = f1; 2; : : : ; M i g of dierent types of connections associated with each user i. Each t ype is characterized by the origin, the destination and the quality level of the connection. By quality level we mean specic quality of service (QoS) guarantees, (for example guarantees on maximum packet loss and delay), that the network is obliged to provide once the connection is accepted. Users can request multiple number of connections over the network. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . The choice of representing users' preferences by quasilinear objective functions imposes the constraint that there are no income eects on network service demand; that is, changes in income or budget available to the users does not change the amount of network services they wish to purchase. This is a typical simplifying assumption in the economic literature when the budget share of the services of interest is small, e.g. when network services are only a relatively small amount o f t h e users' total expenditures.
Users announce their requests to the network during the call setup phase. The network then, assigns virtual circuits (routes) to each origin-destination pair. We denote by V i;j the set of links that belong to the route of a type j connection requested by user i. Once the routes are established the network needs to determine the number of connections that will be accepted as well as the amount of resources (e.g. bandwidth and buers) that need to beallocated along the path of each connection in order to guarantee its requested quality level. The allocation of resources must also maximize a social welfare function P i2N u i (x i ) ; which is the total utility of the users 1 .
We assume that there is a set K = f1; 2; : : : ; K g of dierent types of resources that the network allocates at each link in order to meet the QoS requirements of a connection that is accepted. For example, if bandwidth and buers are the two t ypes of resources that the network allocates in order to establish connections, then K = f1; 2g. In this case, k = 1 refers to bandwidth and k = 2 refers to buers. We denote by r i;j l;k the amount o f a t ype k resource that is reserved at link l for a connection of type j requested by user i. Also, the maximum amount of a type k resource that can beallocated at link l is denoted by R l;k > 0 . W e denote by F i;j , 2 the set of all resource allocations r i;j 4 = fr i;j l;k g l2L;k2K that guarantee the quality level specied by the type j connection requested by user i . Assumption (A1) implies that the underlying preference relations are rational, continuous, strictly convex and locally nonsatiated on X, (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . Assumption (A2) is technical and is needed to establish the existence of optimal allocation strategies that can beobtained as the result of a tatônment process.
Based on the above, we formulate the following optimization problem: 
and B is a suciently large real number. The restriction of x i to the compact space X i is made for technical reasons that appear in the proof of existence of a solution to (MAX 1). This assumption does not aect the optimality condition, since an innite value for x i j would violate the constraint on the available resources { see (3), and notice that the amount of resources r i;j l;k ; k 2 K needed at each link l 2 V i;j to establish the type j connection for user i ; can not all be zero.
In summary, our problem formulation incorporates the following features: (1) the QoS requirements are included into the service provisioning problem, via constraints (2); (2) multiple types of resources r i;j l;k ; k 2 K are allocated at each link l of the network; (3) a virtual path V i;j consists of multiple links; (4) a user can request multiple types of services based on his own preferences. A critique and discussion of the assumptions and features of the problem formulation are presented in Section 5.
In the next section we establish the existence of a solution to (MAX 1).
Existence of a welfare-maximizing solution
The main result of this section is summarized by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 There exists a solution to problem (MAX 1).
Proof:
We rst x r to an allocation that satises (2). Then, Weierstrass's Theorem (Simon and Blume, 1994, p.823) guarantees that the problem (MAX 2) dened below, has a solution.
where (5) is an abbreviation for (1).
If we show that the maximum value function U(r) 4 = P i2N u i (x i (r)), i.e. the objective function of (MAX 2) e v aluated at a maximizer x(r), is a continuous function of r, then the continuity of U(r) together with assumption (A2) and Weierstrass' theorem 8 will guarantee the existence of a solution to the following problem: max r U(r) (MAX 3) subject to, r i;j 2 F i;j ; i 2 N; j 2 M i :
The existence of a solution to the original problem (MAX 1) is then established, since a solution to (MAX 3) is also a solution to (MAX 1).
We n o w show that U(r) i s c o n tinuous. For that matter we use Proposition 3.1, that is given below. The proof of the proposition is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 Consider the correspondence : R 7 ! X dened by r = fx 2 X : g(x; r) 0g, where X is compact and g is a continuous function in X R. Assume that for all r 2 R there exists x 2 X with g(x; r) < 0. Then is continuous in R.
Dene the correspondence, : R 7 ! X; r = fx 2 X : g(x; r) 0g ; where R 4 = IR DL + , X is the same as in (5), and g : X R ! IR KL is dened by g l;k (x; r) = P i2N P j2M i x i j r i;j l;k R l;k ; l 2 L ; k 2 K. The set X is compact. Furthermore g is continuous on X R and g l;k (0; r ) < 0 for all l 2 L and k 2 K . Therefore the conditions of Proposition 3.1 are satised and is a continuous correspondence in R. By assumption (A1) the objective function of (MAX 2) is continuous on X. The Maximum Theorem (Border, 1989, Theorem 12.1,p.64) In the previous section we established the existence of a (welfare-maximizing) solution to problem (MAX 1). We are now interested in the existence of an algorithm that can lead to a solution of (MAX 1), and satises the informational constraints imposed by the nature of the network. To establish the existence of such an algorithm we proceed as follows: First, we describe a competitive market economy that consists of three types of agents and an auctioneer that regulates the prices through an iterative procedure that is based on the aggregate demand and supply. Then, we prove that the procedure used by the auctioneer leads to an allocation that is arbitrarily close to a solution of (MAX 1), in a nite number of steps. This result is given by Theorem 4.1 which is presented later in the section. We now proceed with the description of the market.
Description of the Market
The economy consists of four dierent types of agents: resource providers, service providers, users, and an auctioneer that was mentioned before. We assume that the resource providers, the service providers and the users, are price takers. That is, they behave as if their behavior has, and can have no eect on the equilibrium prices that are reached by the market allocation process. The raw materials that are sold are the resources at each link of the network. The price for a type k resource at link l is denoted by l;k . These resources are treated as if they were owned by the resource providers, who then sell them to the service providers. The service providers, in turn, buy resources at each link in order to produce ow services, which they sell to end users. For example, a service provider might w ant to produce a \bounded-delay guaranteed" service from node A to node B. To do so, it will purchase the use of buers and bandwidth at each link along some path between A and B in amounts sucient to provide the promised service. Users purchase services from service providers; they do not purchase the primitive resources, nor do they need to know how many buers or how m uch bandwidth is being dedicated to their service, nor the path of links that has been established for their ows.
Although we construct the problem as one in which there are two markets { for network resources, and for services { our algorithm works by solving only for a vector of resource prices. We are able to do this because the assumption of price taking that we impose on our agents enables us to directly derive the service prices as a deterministic function of the resource prices. 6 Nonetheless, the characterization of the problem in terms of the two separate markets for separate resources and services is signicant, because the information hiding conditions described above are maintained: the users do not need to know the resource prices, nor the resources being purchased and combined to provide services on their behalf. In the sequel we describe each of the above agents separately.
Resource providers:
Resource providers own the resources (bandwidth, buers, etc.) at each link of the network. We assume that they are price takers and that there is no cost associated with the supply of their resources to the market. The aggregate supply y() a t pricesand k. Therefore, y() = R l;k l2L;k2K , for every 0 : (9) Service providers:
Service providers accept requests for connections from users. Each request is characterized by the triplet: origin, destination and quality level, and is indexed by the pair i; j, where i 2 N refers to the user and j 2 M i refers to the type of connection.
For each user request i; j, the service provider establishes a one-way route V i;j between the origin and the destination and allocates resources r i;j () that minimize the cost of the connection and guarantees the requested quality level. We assume that the service providers are price takers and that they can freely enter or exit the market. An implication of this is that their prot is zero. Based on the above, service providers allocate resources to each type of connection by determining, x i () 2 arg max
; for all i 2 N : (12) For each i 2 N, the optimization problem in (12) is equivalent to the standard utility maximization problem, (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) .
Auctioneer:
The auctioneer regulates the market prices based on the aggregate excess demand vector z(),
Later, in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we show that z() is a continuous function of , (see Proposition 4.1).
During the setup phase users announce to service providers the types of connections (origin, destination, quality level), that they are willing to buy. Then, the service providers establish the routes V i;j for each type of connection i; j , i 2 N; j 2 M i .
After the routes have been established, an iterative procedure begins, during which the auctioneer announces prices , and then uses the corresponding aggregate excess demand function z() to compute the next set of prices . Every time a new price vector is announced by the auctioneer, the service providers determine the amount o f resources r() that according to (10) guarantee the requested quality level and minimize the cost perconnection. Then the prices (11) are announced to the users. Based on these prices users respond by requesting x() n umber of connections, that satisfy (12). The response of the resource providers to any price vector announced by the auctioneer is given by (9).
A detailed description of the algorithm used by the auctioneer to update market prices is presented in Appendix B. Here, in Figure 1 , we present in block-diagram form the auctioneer's algorithm and provide an explanation about the variables that appear in the description of the algorithm. 
Finally, the symbols ; denote modulo LK subtraction and addition, respectively.
The proof of convergence of the auctioneer's algorithm is given by Theorem 4.1, which is presented in the section that follows.
Analysis of the Market

Preliminaries
In this section we show that the recursive process, used by the auctioneer and described in Section 4.1 and Appendix B, leads in a nite numberof iterations, to an allocation that is arbitrarily close to a solution of problem (MAX 1).
We proceed as follows: We rst present briey some known results that are crucial for the analysis of the market. Then, we prove Theorem 4.1, which is the main result of this section. The known results used in the analysis of the market can befound in (Scarf, 1973, Chapters 2-4, 6 , Appendix 1). Here we present them in a way that suits the needs of our analysis.
Dene the simplex S, 
Association of a column with a label
To specify the rule that associates each column of M 2 M with a label from the set f0; : : : ; L K g , w e rst need to make the following denitions: 
The denition of the sets C 0 and C l;k ; l 2 L; k 2 K assumes that the sign of the aggregate excess demand z l;k () is well dened for all l 2 L; k 2 K . Later in the section we show that z() i s a c o n tinuous function of (Proposition 4.1). This makes the above denitions feasible, because z() is a function of and not a correspondence.
We assign to each column c of M the following label (c) :if column c is associated with side s i then (c) = i ; i f c is associated with vector q then, if q 2 C 0 set (c) = 0 , otherwise set (c) = minf(l 1)K + k : q 2 C l;k g :
The main result of this section is based on a combinatorial theorem due to Scarf, (Scarf, 1973 , Theorem 2.5.1). Scarf's theorem and the main idea of the proof, that are both crucial for the analysis of our algorithm, are presented in the next paragraph.
Consider a labeling process that assigns to each side s m (m = 0; : : : ; L K ) of the simplex S the integer m , and to each v ector of the regular grid P an arbitrary integer from the set f0; : : : ; L K g . Then according to (Scarf, 1973 , Theorem 2.5.1), there exists a primitive set each of whose vectors or sides has a dierent label. The proof of this theorem is based on the following iterative procedure, (IP1): (IP1) 1 : Dene a unique replacement operation for a single side or vector of a primitive set in S, that leads to another primitive set in S. 2 : Start with a primitive set all of whose vectors and sides have distinct (nonzero) labels, except for a single pair whose labels are identical.
3 : Replace one of the elements (vector or side), in the pair with the identical labels, using the operation dened in Step 1.
4 : If the new vector or side has a zero label, terminate the procedure. Otherwise, replace the element in the primitive set that has the same label with the element that was just brought in, and repeat Step 4.
The above procedure will terminate only with a primitive set of the required type. It is shown in (Scarf, 1973, pages 47-48 ) that the algorithm never returns to the same position and that every required replacement can be carried out. Therefore, since there are a nite numberof possible primitive sets that can becomposed from the sides of the simplex and the vectors of the regular grid, the algorithm will terminate in a nite numberof steps.
The concepts and results presented above provide the background necessary to proceed with the analysis of the market described in Section 4.1.
Convergence of the Auctioneer's Algorithm
The main result of Section 4.2 is given by the following theorem: Theorem 4.1 The algorithm described i n s e ction 4.1 and depicted in gure 1 l e ads, in a nite number of steps, to a price v e ctor that induces an allocation x(); r ( ) which is arbitrary close to a solution x; r of problem (MAX 1).
Proof:
The proof is based on the combinatorial result (Scarf, 1973 , Theorem 2.5.1) presented above, and proceeds in three steps:
(i) We rst dene a labeling process for the sides of S and the vectors of P, that satises the conditions of Theorem 2.5.1 in (Scarf, 1973) . This establishes the existence of a primitive set T in S with vectors and sides that have distinct labels.
(ii) We show that the auctioneer's algorithm, described in Section 4.1, leads in a nite numberof steps to the set T, (as it implements the steps of the iterative procedure (IP1)).
(iii) We prove that for any q 2 T with q 0 > 0 , the price vector given by (16), induces an allocation that is arbitrarily close to a solution of (MAX 1).
We now proceed to prove the statements made in Steps (i)-(iii).
(i) Consider the following labeling process for the sides of S and the vectors of P: side s m is labeled with integer m; and q 2 P is assigned the label of its associated column of M 2 M, (see the two association rules dened above).
This labeling process satises the conditions of Theorem 2.5.1 in (Scarf, 1973) , thus, it establishes the existence of a primitive set T S such that all of its sides and vectors have distinct labels.
(ii) We show that the auctioneer's algorithm implements the steps of (IP1).
By construction, the auctioneer's algorithm is an iterative process with steps (structure) identical to those of (IP1). Therefore, we only need to prove that the auctioneer's algorithm satises the conditions of Steps 1 and 2 of (IP1).
Let M 2 M beamatrix associated with a primitive set in S 7 , and consider the following rule for replacing an element (side or vector) of the primitive set: nd the column c of M associated with the element of the primitive set that is replaced; replace c by the sum of columns c 1 and c 1 minus the column c itself, as in the auctioneer's algorithm; nd the vector or side associated with that column and use it as a replacement for the original element o f t h e primitive set. Then, according to (Scarf, 1973 , Chapter 2 and Appendix 1), this replacement operation leads to another primitive set in S. The replacement is also unique. Consequently, the replacement operation in the auctioneer's algorithm satises the conditions of Step 1 o f ( IP1).
Let A 0 S be the subsimplex associated with the matrix M 0 , introduced in the description of the auctioneer's algorithm (see equation (14)). Matrix M 0 satises the conditions of Theorems 6.2.1 and 6.2.9 in (Scarf, 1973) , (see note 7), therefore A 0 is a primitive set in S. Furthermore, according to our association rule, all the vectors and sides of A 0 have distinct labels from the set f1; : : : ; L K g , except for a single pair whose labels are identical. Therefore, A 0 , the initially chosen primitive set in the auctioneer's algorithm, meets the conditions of Step 2 o f the iterative process (IP1).
Consequently, the auctioneer's algorithm leads, in a nite numberof steps, to the primitive set T in S with vectors and sides that have distinct labels. The set T contains at least one vector from the regular grid P which is in the interior of the simplex S, (i.e. a v ector the components of which are all positive) 8 .
(iii) We prove that for any q 2 T with q 0 > 0 , the price vector given by (16), induces an allocation that is arbitrarily close to a solution of (MAX 1). According to the labeling process, T has a nonzero intersection with each one of the sets 20 C 0 ; C l;k ; l 2 L; k 2 K , dened by (17), (18) This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Conclusions -Reections
We h a v e presented an approach for optimal admission and resource allocation control in multi-service connection-oriented networks.
The main contribution of our work in this paper is the specication of a convergent and decentralized iterative procedure that leads to a solution of a fairly general admission and resource allocation problem.
The main features of our approach are the following:
(1) The objective of the resource allocation process is to maximize the total value of the network to its users.
(2) The agents are price takers in the markets in which they participate.
(3) There is no cost associated with the supply of network resources.
(4) The sets F i;j are strictly convex, for all i; j .
We now discuss and critique each one of the above features.
(1) In this analysis we assumed that the objective function of interest was to maximize the sum of individual network users' utility functions. It may not be obvious why this is a reasonable objective to consider.
It is important to realize that our point of view is primarily normative, not descriptive. That is, we have taken a particular objective function { one which we believe is often reasonable, but see below { and studied whether a network resource pricing scheme exists that can achieve an optimum for that particular function, and how one might implement that allocation with a market-based algorithm. Thus, we h a v e demonstrated the feasibility of using pricing to achieve a particular performance goal. We are not claiming that this goal describes any particular actual network environment. Nor are we making the stronger normative claim that this objective function should be adopted in any particular setting.
What we have shown is that economic market methods can beharnessed to imple-ment network resource allocations that fulll a particular objective function. We believe that this work provides a template for developing market methods for implementing other objective functions as well. For example, some might think it appropriate for short-run allocation problems, when network resource capacities are relatively xed and there is little opportunity for entry by competing resource providers, to devise automated market mechanisms that maximize the sum of user utilities plus resource provider prots (possibly with some particular weighting on how this total surplus is shared between the users and the providers). To study this problem we would augment the (MAX1) objective function by adding the sum of resource provider prots, and then proceed to analyze the existence and implementation of an optimizing price vector.
We do, in fact, believe that maximizing the sum of user utilities is a reasonable description for a wide variety o f n e t w ork allocation problems. Suppose we are considering a corporate intranet. If the corporation's overall objective is to maximize its prots (in present v alue), then the appropriate interpretation of our problem is to dene each user's \utility" as that user's contribution to corporate prot as a function of the network services it consumes. In other words, the corporation is not (directly) interested in how personally happy an employee is with the network, but on how m uch v alue the network enhances the employee's productivity. Then the sum of user utilities will be the contribution of network services to corporate prots, which is precisely the rm's objective function for this part of the overall management problem. Although it may seem dicult to come up with a reasonable representation of the eect of network services on each user's contribution to corporate prots, at some level this is precisely the problem corporations need to solve for allocating equipment, oce space, subordinates and so forth to each employee { it is well beyond the scope of our research to worry about how the corporation specically formulates these valuation functions.
In a market context, it might be in the interest of a network resource provider to design a marketing system with the goal of maximizing its prots, rather than maximizing the realized utility of its customers. However, if the network provider is competing with other providers and networks are interconnected, then in long-run equilibrium it will tend to be the case that the successful allocation schemes are those that have the net eect of maximizing users' utilities.
Thus, although our method of using prices to allocate network resources cannot be directly applied to every allocation problem with any reasonable objective function, we believe that it has broad applicability t o many existing situations. In any case, when our objective function is the desired goal, we h a v e carefully analyzed the existence and implementability of a pricing scheme to support that objective.
(2) In Section 4.1 we imposed the price-taking assumption to the agents of the market economy. In some network allocation settings price-taking will not be a reasonable assumption, for at least some of the agents. For example, suppose that we are concerned with a single physical network owned by a single resource provider. That provider, then, would be a monopolist. If that provider had the goal of prot-maximization, say, then it would likely know or quickly learn that it could earn more prots by directly manipulating price. In terms of equation (9), the resource provider might oer y l;k less than R l;k for some prices , in order to drive up the price and increase prots (selling fewer units at a suciently higher price). Likewise, there might be only a single service provider. Indeed, in a corporate intranet, the information services division might be both the resource provider and the service provider to the users (corporate employees in general).
How useful is the price-taking assumption? It is not essential for a proof that an algorithm exists that will clear the markets and reach some equilibrium allocation of network resources. However, in general, that allocation will not be asolution of our original optimization problem, (MAX1). As a general matter we could show that equilibrium allocations based on behavior other than price-taking will lead to less ecient allocations, that is, allocations that do not maximize the sum of user utilities subject to the technology constraints (1)-(3) . Therefore, for the purpose of this work we do not study markets in which agents exhibit dierent types of strategic behavior, but limit ourselves to the price-taking behavior that we can show can be harnessed to yield a solution to (MAX1).
Restricting attention to the price-taking case may not in practice be as restrictive a s it seems. Consider the example of a corporate intranet with a single monopoly provider of resources and services. If the management instructs the resource and service provider to behave \as if" it is a price taker (and provides compensation incentives that make it in the provider's best interests to do so) then the desired outcome can beachieved. Essentially, this requires compensating the provider based on the value of the allocation to the company as a whole, rather than based on the provider's own local \prots". If the network is to bemanaged with an agent-based control system, the agents should beprogrammed to act as price takers, whether or not other programmable strategies might seem more desirable from the local viewpoint o f t h e agents.
In a more open, conventionally market-based system, such as a commercial market for virtual data circuits, it is also possible that at a given moment some participants might have some market power, which is to say that they are cognizant of an opportunity to improve their position by acting strategically with respect to price-setting, rather than as a price taker. In such a setting, it might not be possible to directly control behavior to make those participants behave \as if" they are price takers. However, if there are no articial barriers to entry by other providers { for example, if it is possible for another competing rm to build an interconnected network of links with buers and bandwidth { then it will tend to be the case that in a long-run equilib-rium surviving agents will be those who behave as price takers (competition will drive others out of the market). Therefore, we believe there are many circumstances under which the conditions will exist, or can beimposed, that are necessary for our method to provide an equilibrium that is a solution to (MAX1).
(3) When we introduced the resource providers' problem in Section 4.1, we assumed that there is no cost in supplying network resources (bandwidth, buers, etc.) to the market. This cost can beincorporated into our model if we subtract it from the objective function of the optimization problem. We believe that the new problem will have the same qualitative properties with the problem presented in this paper, thus it may lead to a similar type of result.
(4) In Section 2 we made the assumption that the sets F i;j are strictly convex. This condition is necessary for the convergence of the market-based algorithm 9 . If this condition is not satised for some pair i; j , then, in order to be able to use the algorithm, we need to replace F i;j with its maximum strictly convex subset. An important future problem therefore, is to specify an algorithm for nding that relaxed set, and also to be able to characterize how inecient is the resulting allocation compared to the optimum solution, if we knew how to nd it.
Next we show that is lower hemi-continuous. Thus, we must prove that for every r 0 2 R and each o p e n s e t G in X meeting r 0 there is a neighborhood (r 0 ) such that, r 2 (r 0 ) ) r \ G 6 = ; : (A.1) We proceed to determine for every r 0 2 R and every open set G in X meeting r 0 , a neighborhood(r 0 ) such that (A.1) is satised. For that matter, we dene the correspondence, : R 7 ! X ; by r 4 = fx 2 X : g(x; r) < 0 ; (A.2) and show that the lower inverse of G under , dened by,
= fr 2 R : r \ G 6 = ;g ; (A.3) is a neighborhood of r 0 that satises (A.1).
We rst show that [G] is an open set. By assumption, r 6 = ;. Furthermore, since g is upper semi-continuous (as it is continuous) on XR; the graph of , dened by, Gr = f ( x; r) 2 X R : g(x; r) < 0g ; is open. Consequently, is an open correspondence, hence it is lower hemi-continuous, (Border, 1989, Proposition 11.9(c) ). Since i s l o w er hemi-continuous and G is an open set, [G] i s o p e n , (Border, 1989, Denition 11.3) .
We proceed now to establish (A.1) with [G] Therefore, is continuous in R, since it is both upper hemi-continuous and lower hemi-continuous in R. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Appendix B Description of Auctioneer's algorithm
The algorithm is based on the construction of a specic sequence of (LK + 1 ) ( LK + 1 ) matrices, each of which is obtained from the previous one by replacing a single column. The replacement for column c equals the sum of columns c 1 and c 1 minus column c itself. The sequence begins with the matrix M 0 , given in (14).
As it is shown in the proof of Theorem 4.1, replacing a column of M 0 , other than the rst, results in a matrix that has the same properties as M 0 ; that is, its entries are between 1 and D + 1 and the column sums are equal to D .
The rule determining the column that is replaced at each step is the following:
Initial
Step: The rst column of M 0 (m = 0) is labeled with the integer (0) = 1 and each column m (m = 1; 2; : : : ; L K ) is labeled with the integer (m) = m. Thus, all columns of M 0 have distinct labels except for the rst two, whose labels are identical. The algorithm begins by replacing the second column, (according to the procedure described above).
Iteration
Step: An integer (c) 2 f0; 1; : : : ; L K g is assigned to a new column c , 28 that is brought i n to the matrix as a replacement, according to the following rule: If the column has a negative entry, then (c) is the smallest subscript for which this is true. If the column has a zero entry, then (c) is the smallest subscript for which this is true. If none of the above is true, then the label of column c is determined by observing the aggregate excess demand z() that results from the announcement of the price vector, 2. all of the columns have distinct labels, except for a single pair whose labels are identical ;
3. one member of the pair of columns with identical labels has just been brought into the matrix.
(F2) All columns of the matrix have distinct labels that span the set f0; 1; : : : ; L K g (in this case the column whose label is 0 has just been brought i n to the matrix).
If the matrix constructed by the algorithm has feature (F1), the algorithm proceeds by eliminating from the matrix that column in the pair with identical labels that has not just been brought into the matrix. If the matrix constructed by the algorithm has feature (F2), the algorithm terminates. As it is shown in section 4.2, any matrix that is constructed by the algorithm and has feature (F2) contains at least one column with all positive e n tries. This implies that the auctioneer announces at least one set of prices before the algorithm terminates. The demand x() and the resource allocation r() corresponding to the auctioneer's latest prices are arbitrarily close to a solution of (MAX 1). section 3. The compactness of X, the linearity of constraint (6), and the continuity of u i () for all i 2 N, guarantee, by Weierstrass' Theorem (Simon and Blume, 1994, p.823) , the existence of a nite solution x(r) t o ( MAX 2). Notice also that X is convex, u i () is concave for all i 2 N (by assumption (A1)), and that the following constraint qualication holds true:x = 0 belongs in X and is such that, P i2N P j2M ix i j r i;j l;k < R l;k ; for all l 2 L; k 2 K . Therefore, according to (Bazaraa et al., 1993, Corollary, p.210 (20) and (21) respectively, for = .
We next show that, We also have from (20) and (21) that x( 0 ) 2 X and r i;j ( 0 ) 2 F i;j , for all i; j . Therefore x( 0 ); r ( 0 ) i s a feasible solution to problem (MAX 1). Let x; r beany other feasible solution to (MAX 1). From (20) and (21) Such a set results from relations that describe the interaction between resource allocation and QoS requirements along routes. Such relations can be found in (Thomas and Teneketzis, 1997) . 3 We assume that r i;j l;k = 0 if link l doesn't belong to the path V i;j assigned to that connection. 4 That is, for every x 2 X and every > 0, there is x 0 2 X such that k x 0 x k and u i (x 0 ) > u i ( x ), where k x 0 x k is the Euclidean distance between points x 0 and x.
5
A set is strictly convex if every proper convex combination of two points of the set belongs to the interior of the set. In the concluding Section 5, we discuss the role of the price taking assumption in our market-based implementation. 7 Scarf (Scarf, 1973, Theorems 6 .2.1 and 6.2.9), derives conditions for a matrix M 2 M, in order for the vectors or sides of S that are associated with the columns of M to form a primitive set in S. 8 Otherwise T would be formed by sides and/or vectors of P that belong to the sides of S, t h us, it would coincide with S which is not a primitive set (as it contains vectors of P in its interior). 9 We have seen in Section 3, that compactness is the necessary condition for the existence of an optimal allocation. 
